COMMENTS
PRIVATE PLAINTIFF'S STANDING
UNDER CLAYTON ACT SECTION 4:
CLOTHING THE NAKED EMPEROR
A private remedy for redress of injuries sustained because of a
violation of the antitrust laws is provided by section 4 of the Clayton
Act in a seemingly simple and broad congressional grant:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States . .. without respect to the

amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 1

This facially simple grant of a right of action, however, has created
numerous conflicting decisions and "tests" of standing among the circuits to determine who is within the ambit of the statute's protection.
Initially, this Comment will examine a representative sampling of the
circuit court interpretations of standing under section 4 to highlight
the inconsistencies which have developed as to who may bring a private treble damage action. Then, after setting forth in detail the
reasoning of a recent Sixth Circuit decision applying traditional standing concepts to the private treble damage area, the applicability of,
and the functional operation of, standing concepts in section 4 suits

will be critically examined. Finally, tentative solutions will be posited
toward the end of resolving these inconsistencies.
STANDING "TESTS" APPLIED By
THE CIRCUIT COURTS

The circuit courts have generally employed two "tests" of a
plaintiff's standing to sue in private treble damage actions: the "direct
injury" test which, as its name suggests, has its focus upon the directness of the relation between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's allegedly anticompetitive conduct, and the "target area" test
which looks to whether the plaintiff's business or property is in that
1 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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area of the economy within which the defendant's allegedly violative
conduct will have its anticompetitive effect. 2 While these are the two
basic tests employed by the circuits, neither the definitions nor the
applications of these tests are consistent among the circuits.
For example, although the Second Circuit has designated its test
for standing to sue as a "target area" test, that court's emphasis upon
the proximity of the plaintiff to the anticompetitive activity seemingly
makes it just as appropriate to view the test as a "direct injury" test
or a combination of the two. 3 This ambiguity in terms can be seen in
the court's opinion in Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.4 In Billy
Baxter, the plaintiff was a corporation engaged in granting franchises
to bottlers of soft drinks which enabled them to use plaintiff's secret
beverage recipes and market the product under the plaintiff's
trademark. 5 In return, the franchisees paid Billy Baxter certain royalties based upon the amount of their sales. 6 Billy Baxter commenced a
private action against Coca-Cola and Canada Dry alleging numerous
violations of the antitrust laws. 7 The primary activity complained of
was an alleged division of markets "in the 'non-alcboholic carbonated
beverage industry' " which had the effect of substantially restricting
competition in that industry, 8 resulting in a reduction of royalties accruing to Billy Baxter due to the loss of business to its franchisees. 9
In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the trial court
found that Billy Baxter did not have the requisite standing to sue
because, as a franchisor, it was outside the "target area" of the alleged antitrust activity since it was the franchisee-bottlers who were
the targets of the anticompetitive activity.' 0
in affirming, the Second Circuit looked to the legislative intent
of section 4 of the Clayton Act'1 and noted that the statute requires a
"causal connection" between the alleged activity and the injury to be
2

See generally 15 J.

VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION

§ 115.02[4] (1976).
1 See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.7 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
' 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
5 431 F.2d at 184-85. Billy Baxter itself did not manufacture or distribute any
products, but merely supplied its franchisees with extracts purchased elsewhere. Id. at
185.
6

Id.

' Id. at 18.5-86 & n.5.
8 Id.

at 186.

9 Id.
10 Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 47 F.R.D. 345, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd,
431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).

11 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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redressed. 12 While taking cognizance of the role which private plaintiffs were intended to play in antitrust enforcement, 13 the court propounded the limitation that
a plaintiff must allege a causative link to his injury which is "direct"
rather than "incidental" or which indicates that his business or
property was in the "target area" of the defendant's illegal act.14

Thus, in order to determine a private plaintiff's standing to sue, the
Second Circuit adopted a "target area" test which focused upon the
"directness" of the injury alleged.
One year later, in Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc.,15 the same court further entrenched its version

of the "target area" test. Calderone, however, went further than Billy
Baxter in that the question of who was in the "target area" was
closely related to the question of who was intended to be the target.
12 431

F.2d at 187. In addressing the causation issue, the court noted:

The statutory requirement that treble damage suits be based on injuries which
occur "by reason of" antitrust violations expressly restricts the right to sue
under this section. There must be a causal connection between an antitrust
violation and an injury sufficient for the trier of fact to establish that the violation was a "material cause" of or a "substantial factor" in the occurrence of
damage.
Id.
13id.

Id. The court's reasoning can be seen in the following passage:
While any antitrust violation disrupts the competitive economy to some extent
and creates entirely foreseeable ripples of injury which may be shown to reach
individual employees, stockholders, or consumers, it has long been held that
not all of these have the requisite standing to sue for treble damages ....
Contourless rules of causation would pose the threat of a parallel relaxation of
the standard of business behavior enforced by the allowance of treble recovery.
Id. (citations omitted). Judge Waterman's dissent noted the problematic position into
which a court can be put by focusing on the causation element to detenmine standing,
especially when such focus results in the adoption of a "talismanic rule" which determines standing on the basis of the label attached by a court to the plaintiff's class, e.g.,
landlords, stockholders, or franchisors. Id. at 191. As Judge Waterman saw the issue,
in deciding whether a plaintiff has standing to pursue the federally created
cause of action . . . the use by courts in antitrust opinions of inherited decisional labels may have obfuscated the positions of some plaintiffs so as to have
denied them the recoveries which fact-analysis might have indicated they
should have obtained.
id.
Commentators have also taken both sides of this issue. Compare Comment, Standing Under Clay!ton § 4: A ProterbialMysteryj, 77 DiCK. L. REV. 73, 87-88 (1972) with
Balsley, Standing of Franchisor to Sue on Antitrust Violations First Affecting His
Franchisee, 60 ILL. B.J. 638, 645-46 (1972) and Comment, FranchisorStanding to Sue
in Treble Damage Actions, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 702-05 (1971).
15 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
14
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Calderone Enterprises owned a number of theatres in the New
York metropolitan area which were leased to one of the defendants
for operation as motion picture houses. 16 In its complaint Calderone
alleged that through a marketing system known as "Showcase" the
defendants had conspired to restrain trade in the film distribution
market and thereby injured the plaintiffs by reducing the value of its
leased property. 1 7 The Second Circuit, in affirming the district court's
dismissal for lack of standing, found that in order to have standing to
bring a private antitrust action under section 4 of the Clayton Act a
plaintiff must be
a person against whom the conspiracy was aimed, such as a competitor of the persons sued. Accordingly we have drawn a line excluding those who have suffered economic damage by virtue of
their relationships with "targets" or with participants in an alleged
18
antitrust conspiracy, rather than by being "targets" themselves.
The subtle shift in emphasis from "target area" to "target" by the
Second Circuit not only seems to suggest directness, but in certain
types of fact patterns isolating the "target" might tend to focus upon
the defendant's intent, a question of fact frequently unascertainable
until both sides have been heard on the merits. Thus, this inquiry
may sometimes be beyond the threshold issue of the proper litigant
to sue under the statutory grant.19
16 454 F.2d at 1294.
17

Id.

at 1293-94. The "Showcase"

system of distribution was effected by agree-

ments imong distributors and theatre operators whereby "first runs" of films would be
assigned to all suitable theatres on a noncompetitive basis. Since parties to the agreement did not bid competitively for the rights to the pictures, but instead agreed to
accept the films assigned, the theatres were often forced to take films with less box
office appeal, thereby generating less gross receipts than could have been made with
more popular films. Since plaintiff's lease provided for an annual fixed minimum rental
plus a percentage of gross receipts, the plaintiff argued that any diminution of gross
receipts resulted from the anticompetitive behavior, and that this injury could he redressed under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 1294.
18 Id. at 1295. It appears that the fear of opening the courts to the flood of litigation
was at least a factor in the court's ultimate decision. Id.
It is interesting to note that the court saw a necessity to interpret section 4 of the
Clayton Act in much the same way as earlier courts had interpreted Sherman Act §§ 1,
2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). 454 F.2d at 1296. The courts recognized that if a literal
interpretation were given to those sections of the Sherman Act, every action having any
restraining effect upon competition would be illegal. It was therefore necessary to interpret the statutes as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints of trade. The rule of
reason and per se violations were a product of this compromise. See, e.g., Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). See also 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF ANTITRUST 4-5 (1973).
19 The argument that this type of inquiry is inappropriate at the pleading stage has
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The Second Circuit's "target area" test, which has its focus upon
the directness of plaintiff's injury, is similar to the "direct injury" test
of the Third Circuit. The seminal decision in the Third Circuit was
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,20 where the plaintiff was a shareholder
and creditor of a corporation which had allegedly been forced out of
business by defendant's antitrust violations. 2 1 The court analyzed the
question of whether the plaintiff was a proper party to bring the action by reference to what remedies would have been available to the
plaintiff at common law. 2 2 The Loeb court found that under the
common law "[t]he remedy for such an injury resided in the first
instance, solely in the corporation," and determined that the Act's
purpose was not to give numerous stockholders "rights of action"
when a more efficient method would be "a single suit in the name of
the corporation. "23 Since the plaintiff's injuries were derivative, indirect, and consequential, the court affirmed the sustaining of defendant's demurrer. 24
A relatively recent Third Circuit decision has reaffirmed that
court's adherence to the "direct injury" test. In Kauffman v. Dreyfus
Fund, Inc. ,25 the plaintiff, a shareholder of four mutual funds, alleged
that defendants violated the antitrust laws through attempts to
stabilize management service fees in the mutual fund market, and
that as a result he suffered economic injury by virtue of the damages
caused to the funds in which he had an interest. 26 The court, consistent with the position adopted in Loeb, held that since a shareholder
of a corporation is only indirectly harmed by anticompetitive activity
which causes the diminution in value of his shares, he is without
recently been made by the Sixth Circuit. Nialamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142,
1149 (6th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the AIolaimud decision see notes 51-80 infra
and accompanying text.
20 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
21

Id. at 707.

Id. at 709. It should be noted that the action was commenced pursuant to section
7 of the Sherman Act, id. at 705, which later became section 4 of the Clayton Act. See
Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4. 38 Stat. 731, repealing Act of July 7, 1890, ch. 647, § 7,
26 Stat. 210.
22

23

183 F. at 709.

24 /d. at 711. The reasoning of the Loeb court is subject to criticism on at least one

major issue. Since the purpose of enacting the private remedy section was to provide an
effective supplement to the public enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Department
of Justice, it could not have been the intent of Congress to entrench "'the barrier" where
it was before the statute. See Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329
(1955); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1954). See also Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of The Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
570, 571 (1964).
25 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
26 434 F.2d at 731-32.
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standing to sue in his own right, but may only sue derivatively. 27
While the "direct injury" test applied by the Third Circuit in
Loeb and Kauffman may be explained as an application of the principles of common law derivative suits, Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's,
Inc. 28 more clearly reflects that circuit's position. In Melrose, the
court affirmed a grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment
despite the fact that plaintiff theatre-lessor alleged that the defendants, including the lessee, had conspired to allow another theatre
"to have a key-run of motion pictures" with the result that the
plaintiff-landlord lost profits under his percentage-of-gross receipts
lease. 29
The requirement that a plaintiff show that he was a "target" of an
anticompetitive scheme or was directly, not derivatively, injured by
reason of such a scheme, has not been accepted, or applied in the
same manner, by all of the circuits. For example, in Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's, Inc. ,30 the Seventh Circuit, in a case factually
similar to Calderone and Melrose, 3 l took a position contrary to those
27

/d. at 732-33. The court's language distinguishing between the primary right to

sue and the derivative right of a shareholder is noteworthy:
Indeed, were the rule otherwise the distinction between a stockholder's
derivative claim and a claim exercised in his primary right would disappear,
and the public policy based strictures on derivative suits could be avoided
merely by asserting that economic harm to a corporation in itself constituted
justiciable personal injury to each owner of stock in the corporation.
Id. at 733 (quoting from Ash v. IB1M, 353 F.2d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 927 (1966)).
While the Third Circuit's "direct injury" test which distinguishes between primary
and derivative rights seems to be founded on relatively soid gound, it has ben, criticized as being anachronistic and based upon notions of "privity" which have for the
most part fallen into disuse. For example, Judge Waterman, in his dissenting opinion in
Billy! Baxter, noted that the Loeb decision was rendered in "the days when 'privity' was
king and even MacPherson v. Buick lotors, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), had
not been written.' 431 F.2d at 190.
The "privity" approach as used in the "direct injury" test of the Third Circuit as
well as its use by the Second Circuit in other areas was further criticized by Judge
Levet in his dissenting opinion in Calderone:
The type of "privity" approach which the courts have attempted to create
with the directness requirement in the corporate cases, such as in Loeb, has
been extended into other areas and a number of Second Circuit decisions have
examined this question. For example, in alleged antitrust violations where the
plaintiff suffers losses and injuries resulting from a diminution of profitable relations, some courts still hold that the plaintiff has no cause of action.
454 F.2d at 1299.
28 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956).
29 234 F.2d at 519.
30 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
3i As in Calderone and Melrose, the landlord in Congress Building was to receive a
minimum rental plus a percentage of gross receipts realized from the operation of the
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cases and granted the plaintiff-landlord standing by applying its
version of the "direct injury" test. That test merges the concepts of
directness of injury and proximate causation, 32 thereby downplaying
the importance of privity3 3 between the parties, while introducing the
element of foreseeability of injury34 as a factor to be considered in the
determination of a plaintiff's standing. 35 Thus, the plaintiff-landlord in
Congress Building Corp. was found to have standing to sue on the
ground that the anticompetitive conspiracy entered into by the defendant-lessee deprived the landlord of profits under the percentage-of-gross receipts lease which was "clearly the direct and proxi36
mate cause of the injury."In addition, the Ninth Circuit has, during the last twenty-five
years, developed its own "target area" test. The Ninth Circuit test
focuses upon the "area of the economy which is endangered by a
breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry." 3 7 In
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp. ,3 the plaintiff brought its private treble damage action against the defendant after a successful civil
action by the Department of Justice. Karseal alleged that its products
were denied access to the market because of certain exclusive dealing
contracts entered into by Richfield and its service stations whereby
theatre. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's anticompetitive activity in the area of
first-run engagements for motion pictures had the effect of substantially lessening his
"hope" of greater profits. Id. at 588, 593.
32 Id. at 593. The court reasoned:
If the plaintiff's allegations are proved, we are at a loss to see how it can
be said that it has not been injured. In fact, everyone seems to concede the
existence of the injury, but then counter with the argument that it is too remote
to be compensable. We think the alleged acts of the defendants are clearly the
direct and proximate cause of the injury.
Id.
3, See note 27 supra.
3 246 F.2d at 594-95. The court expressly rejected the strict "direct injury" rule of
the Third Circuit. Id. at 595.
35 Courts and commentators alike have been unable to agree on whether the decision in Congress Building was correct. Compare Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1299 (2d Cir. 1971) (Levet, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) with Comment, Standing Under Clayton § 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DiCK. L. REV. 73, 79-80 (1972). There has also been disagreement
on how to classify the test used by the court. Compare In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) with Note,
supra note 24, at 583.
36 246 F.2d at 593.
37 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See also Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirements for
Antitrust Plaintiffs: Judicially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy, 4 U.
SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 205, 209-10 (1970); Note, supra note 24, at 584.

38 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
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the stations purchased only Richfield's waxes and polishes. 39 The
court framed the standing issue in the following manner:
Assuming Karseal was "hit" by the effect of the Richfield antitrust
violations, was Karseal "aimed at" with enough precision 40
to entitle
it to maintain a treble damage suit under the Clayton Act?
This question was answered by looking to the market involved, the
effect the restraints of competition had on the market, and Karseal's
relationship to that market. 4 1 The court then concluded that since
"the illegal acts were directed against the manufacturers and distributors of the competing products," persons in the position of Kar42
seal were "targets" and therefore entitled to bring a private action.
The Ninth Circuit continued to utilize its "target area" test in
subsequent decisions, 43 and a recent example of its application can
be seen in Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions.4 4 In Mulvey,
the plaintiff owned "Pride of the Yankees," a major motion picture
which he sold to the defendant for $1,500,000. The terms of sale
required the defendant to pay $100,000 down in 1948 with the plaintiff to receive a yearly percentage of the net receipts generated by the
defendant's distribution of the film. If by September 30, 1973, the
amount owed to Mulvey did not equal the agreed upon price, the
parties agreed to reduce the purchase price to the amount already
paid. 45 Goldwyn, however, took Mulvey's film and four others subsequently acquired from Mulvey and sold them as a "package" for ex39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.

at
at
at
at

360-61.
362.
364.
364-65. The court addressed the issue of congressional intent in) enacting

the private treble damage section and found that the interpretation of
[tihe language of the statute does not warrant [a] restrictive interpretation. The
Congress in the Clayton Act, stated in Sec. 4, "A ny person who shall be injured
may sue'.. . . . The Congress did not attempt to limit the relief to those
manufacturing or distributing.
1d. at 365 (emphasis by the court).
Commentators have tended to agree that the less restrictive approach taken by the
Karseal court is the most desirable. See, e.g., Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing
On, 26 BAYLO R L. REV. 331, 339 (1974); Note, s upra note 24, at 586; 19 CASE WV.RES.
L. REV. 132, 138 (1967); (f. Comment, FranchisorStanding to Sue in Treble Damage
Actions, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 696, 699 (1971).
43 See, e.g., Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967); Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir. 1964).
44 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
45 433 F.2d at 1074. The original contract was with the Goldwyn corporation which
was soon dissolved, and the interest in Mulvey's films, as well as its contractual obligations, were transferred to Samuel Goldwyn Productions, the defendant in this action. Id.
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hibition on television, thereby reducing the amount of gross receipts
which would have been generated by Mulvey's film had it been distributed separately. 4 6 Goldwyn, while conceding that this "block
booking" of the films was an antitrust violation, 47 persuaded the district court that such conduct was aimed not at Mulvey but at the
television stations. 48 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the conclusion of the trial court and, in colorful language, held that
Mulvey was "hit" . . . squarely . . . . He was neither sideswiped
nor struck by a carom shot. He was within the area "which it could

reasonably be foreseen would be affected" by block booking. 49

Mulvey, then, under this "target area" test had standing to sue.
The standing tests employed by the Second and Third Circuits
can be contrasted to the test of the Ninth Circuit which represent the
two poles of the section 4 controversy. The Second and Third Circuits
have seemingly adopted the more stringent "direct injury" test-even
though the Second Circuit has designated its test as a "target area"
test-which is closely linked to the concept of proximate causation.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit employs a more liberal "target
area" test which looks generally to that area of the economy which
will be -affected by the defendant's anticompetitive conduct. Within
these two limits, the other circuits have lined up by adopting some
form of the "direct injury" or "target area" tests, or a hybrid of the
46 id.

47Id. Block booking is a type of tying arrangement which
enables a distributor to obtain greater revenue from less desirable films by forcing an exhibitor who desires other films to take the entire package. An exhibitor
who refuses to accept the less desirable films will be denied the films of greater worth. Block booking thereby enhances the market value of those films of
lesser intrinsic merit. If exhibitors refuse to accept the entire package, the revenue normally generated by the more desirable films will be substantially reduced.
Id. at 1076.
48 See id. at 1076. The trial court apparently decided that since "Mulvey was
neither a supplier of motion pictures to television nor a customer in the market" he
lacked standing to bring the action. See id.
49Id. It has been suggested that the lulveyj court added a different element to the

"target area" test by looking to the issue of foreseeability as a key factor in determining
standing. See Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on
Standing to Sue and Causation under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 351, 356 (1971). While this approach has been employed by other courts, see,
e.g., Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1957), the
adoption of a foreseeability test has been criticized, and later decisions have ignored the
issue, see 24 VAND. L. REV. 803, 804-05, 807 (1971). For a result different than Mulvey
on almost identical facts see Fields Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
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two. 5 0 As has been demonstrated, the circuits are hopelessly divided
regarding the applications of, or even the definitions of, the various
tests.
Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp. ,51
attempted an innovative approach to this problem, rejecting both the
"direct injury" and "target area" tests, and applying in their stead
traditional standing concepts. In Malamud, there were three categories of plaintiffs: a petroleum distributor; real estate and investment
companies; and, individual plaintiffs who were the directors, officers,
and sole shareholders of the corporate plaintiffs. 52 The complaint al'leged that in 1965, plaintiff Malco Petroleum (the distributor) entered
into a three-year distribution contract with Sinclair. Concurrently, the
parties reached an oral agreement whereby Sinclair "would provide
financial assistance to the investment companies to aid their efforts to
53
acquire and develop new service station properties for Sinclair."Malamud alleged that Sinclair refused assistance on all of its proposed acquisitions and refused to grant an early termination of the distribution contract, thereby making it impossible to negotiate another
54
contract with any of Sinclair's competitors.
The plaintiffs brought a private treble damage action against
Sinclair alleging multiple violations of both the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 55 the primary allegation being that Sinclair's refusal to release
Malco from its distribution contract was an attempt "to maintain the
status quo for the marketing of petroleum products in that area
served by the distributorship. '5 6 The trial court, relying upon a prior
Sixth Circuit decision, 5 7 dismissed the complaint as to both the dis50 Compare Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731-33 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973) ("direct injury" approach) with Sanitary Milk Producers v.
Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 689 (8th Cir. 1966) ("target area" approach)
and South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th
Cir. 1966) ("target area" approach). See also In re Nlultidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
Control, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (circuit tests
analyzed without reference to "'self-descriptions").
51 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
52 1&

at 1144.

id.
4 Id. Malanud did negotiate another contract with Texaco, but was unable to cornmence operations until the expiration of the Sinclair contract. Immediately upon termination, Malco commenced this antitrust action. Id.
55 Specifically, the complaint alleged violations under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (restraint of trade), and section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1970) (agreements restricting use of competitors' goods). 521 F.2d at 1144-45.
56 521 F.2d at 1151.
57 Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
53
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tributor and the individual plaintiffs for lack of standing to sue on the
ground that they had not suffered sufficiently direct injury to make
out an antitrust claim. 58 The trial judge, however, was not able to
reach a determination on the standing of the real estate investment
59
companies, and certified the question for appeal.
The Sixth Circuit, in deciding that the investment companies did
have standing to sue, noted the "troublesome" nature of section 4
standing questions and attributed the problem to the "broad wording
of the statute itself." 60 Moreover, the Malamud court recognized that
almost all lower courts have judicially restricted the applicability of
section 4 by "employ[ing] the standing doctrine as a screening device
to deny plaintiffs access to the courts."61
The court initiated its standing analysis by noting that the doctrine, as it traditionally developed, is an aspect of justiciability which
can be described as
an analytical approach that has been "developed to identify appropriate occasions for judicial action, both as a matter of defining the
limits of the judicial power created by Article III of the Constitution, and as a matter of justifying refusals to exercise the power
even in cases within the reach of Article Ill. 62
In addition to the constitutionally imposed jurisdictional limitations of
article III and judicial self-restraint, the court recognized that, within
these boundaries, Congress could expand or restrict the jurisdiction
58 521 F.2d at 1145. The trial court held that although these plaintiffs might have
standing under the public law standing test enunciated in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the plaintiffs did not have standing
under what the trial court believed to be the Sixth Circuit test enunciated in Volasco
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 907 (1963), since there was a lack of direct causation between the violation alleged
and the injury sustained. 521 F.2d at 1145.
59 521 F.2d at 1145-46.
60 Id. at 1146.
61 Id. The court observed:
"The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress
did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries
that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation."
Id. (quoting from Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972)). While this
language seems to implicitly support a restrictive test, inasmuch as the Court did not
criticize the positions taken by the lower courts, the decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co. simply held that a state, as parens patriae, cannot sue on behalf of its citizenry for
injury to the state's economy generally under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 405 U.S. at
252-53, 266.
62 521 F.2d at 1146 (quoting from 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529, at 146 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT]).
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of the courts through statutory means.6 3 As the Malamud court
noted, the standing doctrine, when viewed as one aspect of the larger
scheme of justiciability, usually "pertains to suits brought by individuals or groups challenging governmental action which has allegedly
prejudiced their interests." 64 In private suits, however, the concept
normally used is that of the real party in interest. 65 Under section 4,
"the real party in interest [is] any person who has been injured," 66
and this would "comport with the minimum requirements of Article
III of the Constitution, i.e., injury in

fact."

67

After this general examination of standing, the Malamnud court
examined, and rejected, the "direct injury" and "target area" tests
applied by the other circuits. 68 It noted that these tests focused

"upon the statute's causation language . . . and incorporated
it into

their notions of standing, thus creating a second obstacle for any
prospective plaintiff." 69 The court rejected such an analysis, however,
on the grounds "that as standing doctrines both theories really demand too much from plaintiffs at the pleading stage of a case" and
that both approaches confuse "the determination of a litigant's standing and a decision on the merits of his position."70
The Malarnud court found that the problem of standing in private antitrust actions was resolvable, however, and "that the test to
be applied" 7 1 was the same test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp. 72 The Data Processing test was developed in order to
determine a litigant's standing to challenge administrative action
when the right to challenge such action was derived from a statutory
grant. 73 Under that test a plaintiff must allege both "injury in fact"
and that he was "arguably within the zone of interests" which it was
the intention of the statute to protect. 74 The Malamud court recognized that since the test was developed in another area of the law,
63 521 F.2d at 1147.
64 1d.

651d. See also W'RIGHT, supra note 62, § 3531,

-The

at 176; Has], Standing Revisited
Aftermath Of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 13 (1973).
66 521 F.2d at 1148 (emphasis in original).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1148-49.
69ld. at 1148.
70

Id. at 1149.

71 Id.

at 1151.

72 397 U.S. 150 (1970). For a discussion of the Data Processing case see notes 95-99
infra and accompanying text.
73 See note 96 infra.
74 397 U.S. at 152-53.
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"its uncritical application to cases involving non-governmental action"
might not be altogether appropriate. 75 But the court was able to
reconcile that problem by reasoning that
a private antitrust action is not the typically private suit which
raises no standing issues because the real party in interest is obvious. . . . Because a private action under Section 4 has some con76
siderable enforcement value, it is in the nature of a public suit.

Applying the Data Processing test to the investment firms, the
court determined that the plaintiff had alleged injury in fact, the first
prong of the test, in its allegation of foreclosure from additional expansion in the petroleum products market. 7 7 The court then found
that the second prong of the test was satisfied since the plaintiff alleged that Sinclair had attempted to maintain the status quo in the
petroleum products market by its failure to aid Malamud's expansion
plans. Thus, the plaintiff's allegations were "arguably within the zone
of interests"-open competition-which the antitrust statutes were
designed to protect. Therefore, the plaintiff had standing to sue "[rlegardless of what the proof at trial may show. '- 78
On initial examination, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Malamud
appears to be a rational solution to the murky problem of who should
be allowed to come before the court to sue for treble damages in a
private action brought pursuant to section 4. Malaimud's reliance on
traditional standing concepts developed in the public law sector re75521 F.2d at 1151.
76 Id. (citation onitted) (emphasis added).
77Id.

' 81d. at 1151-52. The court's reasoning is somewhat obscure on this point. The
court stated:
The plaintiffs contend that Sinclair sought to maintain the status quo for the
marketing of petroleum products in that area served by the distributorship. As a
means to that end, it is charged that Sinclair refused to assist the investment
companies in their expansion efforts. The interest sought to be protected by the
real estate firms is the expansion of their business by the acquisition and development of additional service station sites. The parties entered into a financing agreement to achieve that purpose, but no acquisition proposal was ever
agreed to. The antitrust laws were enacted to preserve competition and thereby
to protect the individual plaintiff and the consuming public from the effects of
any combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. . . . Under the circumstances as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, this denial of financing arguably
comes within the zone of interests protected by the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Id. (citations omitted). The court's reasoning might have been clearer had it simply
noted that an increase in the number of service stations would have the effect of increasing competition and, therefore, the plaintiff's interest was in promoting competition, rather than defining the interest in terms of "acquisition and development" of
properties.
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quires a minimal showing by the plaintiff at the pleading stage, i.e.,
injury in fact, and that the plaintiff's allegations of injury are "arguably within the zone of interests" which Congress, through the
statutory mandate, sought to protect. Thus, the Malainud court's application of the Data Processing test to private treble damage actions
apparently has two salient benefits: a reduced likelihood that plaintiffs will be dismissed at the pleading stage, and a liberal interpretation of the congressional intent to provide redress of private injuries
while, at the same time, enforcing the policy of open competition
through such litigation.
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
APPLICATION OF STANDING CONCEPTS TO
PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS

As the Malarnud court noted, public law standing theory should
be applied to private treble damage actions with great caution. 79 Before applying traditional standing concepts to private antitrust cases,
the Malamud court adopted as its basic premise the idea that, because of its inherent enforcement value, the section 4 action "is in the
nature of a public suit." 80 As will be developed below, however, the
separation of powers considerations which underlie public law standing theories are conceptually inapplicable to standing considerations
in section 4 suits.
The standing formula which was adopted in Malainud has its
origins in what can be termed the injury coupled with an interest test
first articulated by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in Joint
Anti-Fa.ci.t Rpfiigee Conmmittie v, MGrath.8 1 In that case, the Court
held that where the Attorney General had classified the plaintiff organization as communist in an arbitrary fashion and without delegated
79 See
80

id. at 1151.

Id. Public suits can be (lefined as ones in which a private individual or group

challenges governmental action or inaction. Standing has developed as a doctrine which
seeks to define who is the proper party to bring such a suit. See WRIGHT, supra note 62,
§ 3531, at 176; Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 645, 646-47 (1973). See also Hasl, supra note 65, at 13. The distinction between
public law and private law, in this context, was put quite succinctly by Dean Hasl when
he noted:
Standing . . . relates primarily to situations in which an individual or a group
challenges governmental action on the grounds that it violates private rights or
some constitutional principle. This definition distinguishes the concept of
standing from the "real party in interest" and "capacity" tests used in cases not
involving governmental action.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
81341 U.S. 123, 149, 152-53 (1951).
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authority the plaintiffs had standing to come before the courts to seek
redress for their alleged "serious damages." 82 Justice Frankfurter
opined that the allegation of injury alone would be insufficient to
allow a court to intervene between allegedly injured parties and an
officer of another branch of government because of constraints which
our tripartite form of government constitutionally placed upon the
judiciary. 8 3 Recognizing the role which the separation of powers doctrine plays in the constitutional scheme, and the balancing of functions which that doctrine mandates, Justice Frankfurter advocated a
standing test which would require a litigant to allege injury to a legally "protected interest" in order to come within the court's sphere
of power. 84 Thus,
[a] litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action
of a sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of
action cognizable by the courts .... Or standing may be based on
an interest created by the Constitution or a statute ....

But if no

comparable common-law right exists and no such constitutional or
statutory interest has been created, relief is not available judicially
. .. [because] there is no protected interest .... 85

Once the injury was found to be to an interest within one of these
categories, the separation of powers doctrine was no longer an obstacle to a judicial determination of the merits86 since the court's power
82

1d. at 137-41.
83 Id. at 150-52. The scope of the judiciary's power vis-h-vis the other branches of
government is rooted in the early history of our republic. For a detailed analysis of the
early conflicts which form the basis of present doctrines see Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning of the Separation of Powers, 5
SETON HALL L. REv. 435 (1974).
Justice Frankfurter's analysis of the standing doctrine was obviously keyed to the
separation of powers problem inherent in any judicial incursion into the province of
another branch of the Federal Government. He noted that
[t]he scope and consequences of the review with which the judiciary is entrusted over executive and legislative action require us to observe these bounds
fastidiously....
. . . Regard for the separation of powers . . . and for the importance to
correct decision of adequate presentation of issues by clashing interests . . .
restricts the courts of the United States to issues presented in an adversary
manner.
341 U.S. at 150-51 (citations omitted).
341 U.S. at 152.
8 Id. (citations & footnote omitted).
" Justice Frankfurter's implicit recognition of the necessity for judicial deference to
the separation of powers doctrine can be seen in his conclusion that,
[oln the balance of all considerations, the exercise here of judicial power accords with traditional canons for access to courts without inroads on the effec-
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to act could be concretely founded upon a common law right, a constitutional grant, or a congressional mandate in the form of a statute.
The Court's adoption of the injury coupled with an interest test
is further illustrated by the resolution, albeit narrow, of the standing
issue in Flast v. Cohen.8 7 In Flast, the plaintiff, a federal taxpayer,
brought suit to enjoin the expenditure of certain funds which would
be used to provide instruction and materials in sectarian educational
institutions.88 The expenditures, it was contended, would contravene
the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment. 8 9
In determining the issue of standing, the Court was faced with its
earlier ruling in Frothingham v. Mellon9 0 which seemed to hold absolutely that a federal taxpayer was without standing to challenge a
federal expenditure as being unconstitutional. 9 1 In Flast, however,
the Court noted that the decision in Frothingham seemed to be based
"on something less than a constitutional foundation" and
was probably
grounded on "pure policy considerations." 9 2 Since the Flast Court
found that the establishment clause of the first amendment operated
as a specific limitation on Congress' taxing and spending power, 9 3 that
constitutional provision gave rise to the type of protectable interest
required to give the party standing to bring the action. 94
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 95 Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority of the Court, rejected the strict "legal interest" test in favor of what was considered a
less restrictive test for cases arising under a statute. 96 Focusing on
ti, e conduct of government.
Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
87 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
88 Id. at 85-86.
89 1d. at 86.
90 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
91Id. at 488-89. Frothingham's claim was based on a deprivation of property without due process under the fifth amendment. Id. at 486.
92 392 U.S. at 93.
93
Id. at 104.
94 Id. at 100-03. It seems clear that what Justice Frankfurter called a legally protected interest, as defined by constitutional, statutory or common law factors, is equatable to the "stake in the outcome of the controversy" as determined by the dual "nexus"
test of Flast. See id. at 102-03.
95 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
9
6 Id. at 153 & n.1. Data Processing and the companion case of Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159 (1970), were actions challenging administrative action pursuant to section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), which provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof.
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the protective intent of a statute which confers standing on private
parties to challenge administrative action, 97 the Court, reflecting separation of powers considerations, held that a party had standing if he
alleged "injury in fact" 9 8 and
the interest sought to be protected . . is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 99

While the labels placed on the tests employed may differ, a direct line can be traced from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence. in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee through Flast to Data Processing.'0 0
The primary concern shared by these cases is the establishment of
the requisite interest of the party challenging governmental action
under either the Constitution, a statute, or the common law, so that
plaintiffs may meet the minimum requirements of article III, and
courts may avoid separation of powers problems.101
While separation of powers considerations underlie public law
standing tests such as that adopted by the Court in Data Processing,
those considerations are absent in private treble damage actions, and,
therefore, the Malaimud court's adoption of the Data Processing test
for standing is inappropriate. The Malaimud court, in adopting the
Data Processing test, reasoned that "[b]ecause a private action under
Section 4 has some considerable enforcement value, it is in the nature of a public suit."102 While the treble damage action does serve
to promote the policy of free and open competition, this fact does not
serve to transform the private suit into an action "in the nature of a
public suit" as that term is used in cases like Data Processing.10 3 That
97 See
98

Scott, supra note 80, at 654, 663.
397 U.S. at 152.

99Id.

at 153.

100 In his dissent in Data Processing and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 177

(1970), Justice Brennan noted:
The formulation of the inquiry [as set out in the majority opinion] most certainly bears a disquieting similarity to the erroneous notion that a plaintiff has
no standing unless he can establish the existence of a legally protected interest.
Similarly, Dean Hasl sees the Data Processing zone of interests test as being "quite
similar" to the "nexus test" of Flast, the distinction being only the degree of particularization employed by the tests. Hasl, supra note 65, at 21.
101 Although the Court did not appear to base its opinion on the separation of powers problem, the Court did note that Article III considerations are critical in determining questions of standing. The Court, however, chose to rely on the fact that Congress
can "resolve" the separation of powers question by allowing challenges to governmental
action by "aggrieved 'persons.' " See 397 U.S. at 154-55.
102 521 F.2d at 1151.
103 See note 80 supra.
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case was a "public action" because it was a suit brought against the
government. Therefore, when the Court looked to whether the plaintiffs' allegations fell "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by the statute, the Court was merely demonstrating that it
would not invade the province of a coequal branch of government
unless it found the authority to do so within a congressional mandate.
Section 4 cases, however, are conspicuously devoid of such separation
of powers considerations since all such actions are, by definition, between private parties. The only factor which makes a section 4 action
"in the nature of a public suit" is that the public is incidentally benefited by the plaintiff's removal of the anticompetitive conduct in his
pursuit of a trebled award.
Adoption of the Data Processing test fails on a practical level as
well in that, arguably, the "zone of interests to be protected" by the
antitrust laws encompasses "[a]ny person . . . injured . . . by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 10 4 Thus, in the absence
of limiting principles being employed, the Malarnud court's interpretation of section 4 would allow all persons access to the courts at the
pleading stage of litigation. Moreover, the injury-in-fact prong of the
Data Processing test cannot work as a limiting principle because
under the statute injury in fact constitutes merely a "defin[ition of]
the real party in interest as being any person who has been injured,"
which "would seem also to comport with the minimum requirements
of Article III of the Constitution.' 10 5 In sum, application of the public
law standing test of Data Processing will fail in antitrust cases because
it would bring courts full circle to the original problem of permitting
all persons access to the courts under section 4 at the pleading stage.
Not only are the public law standing concepts adopted by the
court in Malarnud inapposite and impractical, but that court's rejection of the "direct injury" and "target area" tests as "demand[ing] too
much from plaintiffs at the pleading stage of a case' 1 6 must also be
closely scrutinized. Initially, the court noted that standing tests perform the dual function of denying access to the courts to "those plaintiffs who are jurisdictionally barred by Article III from maintaining a
suit" and enforcing, as to those plaintiffs who overcome that hurdle,
"a policy of judicial self-restraint.' 1 7 Article III, however, does not
present problems to antitrust plaintiffs since "[c]learly provided for
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added). See also 2 N4.HANDLER,

104

887 (1975).
521 F.2d at 1148. See 6 WRIGHT, su pra note 62, § 1542, at 639-42.
521 F.2d at 1149.

YEARS OF ANTITRUST
105
106

Id.

107

TWENTY-FIVE
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under Section 4 is the requirement that any person must have suffered injury at the hands of the defendant."' 0 8 The Malamud court
saw the problem of the "direct injury" and "target area" tests in the
fact that courts, while pursuing a policy of limiting access to the
courts for some section 4 plaintiffs, have caused "confusion between
the determination of a litigant's standing and a decision on the merits

of his position": 10 9
[B]y using either approach a court is enabled to make a determination on the merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the standing of the claimant. Under either theory the entire question of directness is one that must be resolved upon some factual showing,
but standing is a preliminary determination ordinarily to be evaluated upon the allegations of the complaint. As a result, a party may
make sufficient allegations to demonstrate the necessary standing to
sue but fail to prove his case on the merits."10
Thus, in the Malamud court's view, the "direct injury" and "target
area" tests, which focus upon the "by reason of" or causation language of the statute, are invalid since they look, not at the party
bringing the suit, but at the merits upon which the party ultimately

hopes to win his suit.
In order to examine the validity of the Malamud court's criticism
of the use of the "direct injury" and "target area" tests as going to the
merits of the plaintiff's claim, a crucial distinction must be made. The
causation language of the statute-injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"-can be used in two distinct contexts:
causation in fact, and causation in law. An analogy to common law
negligence principles makes this distinction readily apparent:
Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact
been one of the causes of the plaintiff's injury, there remains the
question whether the defendant should be legally responsible for
what he has caused. Unlike the fact of causation . . .this is essentially a problem of law. It is sometimes said to be a question of
whether the conduct has been so significant and important a cause
that the defendant should be legally responsible. But both significance and importance turn upon conclusions in terms of legal policy, so that this becomes essentially a question of whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the
consequences which have in fact occurred."'
108 Id.

109
Id.
110Id. at 1150 (footnote omitted) (emphasis by the court).
"' W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 244 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted).

1976]

COMMENTS

Keeping in mind the distinction between causation in fact and
causation in law, an examination of the operation of the "direct injury" and "target area" tests in section 4 litigation reveals that the
M'alamud court's objection to these tests on the ground that they look
to the merits of the plaintiff's claim is unfounded. The circuit courts,
by applying either the "direct injury" or "target area" test, generally
eliminate plaintiffs for lack of standing when a defendant brings a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted 1 2 or a motion for summary judgment.113 However, disposing
of the plaintiff's claim by way of such motions in these antitrust cases
does not operate as a decision on the merits of the plaintiff's claim in
the same sense as would a determination of causation in fact.
A court will not grant a motion for summary judgment unless the
movant has shown that, upon all the credible evidence, no genuine
issues of fact exist and that he is entitled to a favorable judgment as a
matter of law. 114 The motion for summary judgment goes to the
merits only in the sense that, if the defendant's motion is granted, it
will act as a bar to later assertion of the same claim. 1 15 Thus, when a
court grants the motion in a private treble damage action, the defendant necessarily has shown that no facts need be determined at trial,
and that while the plaintiff may have sustained an injury, that injury
was not "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," i.e.,
there was no causation as a matter of law.
Similarly, while a motion for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted will be treated as a motion for summary judgment if the court considers matter outside of the pleadings, 116 the
motion generally is used as the "method of testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. "117 When the motion is made, all "wellpleaded material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted," 118 and the complaint should not be dismissed "unless it
appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under
any [set] of facts which could be proved. '"119 Thus, as this motion
does not "find" facts but rather accepts them as true for the purpose
112 FED.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

113 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
114

6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

56.15[3], at 473 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter

cited as MOORE].
1151Id.
56.03, at 55.

116 FED. R. Civ.. P. 12(b)(6). See 2A MOORE, supra note 114,
2302.
117 id.
12.08, at 2266 (footnote omitted).
11

Id. at 2267 (footnote omitted).

119 Id. at 2274 (emphasis deleted).

12.09[3], at 2297-
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of the motion, a dismissal of the plaintiff's claim on this motion is,
again, not similar to a finding of causation in fact. Instead, taking all
of the plaintiff's allegations as true, a granting of the motion shows
that the plaintiff could not be successful on his proofs as a matter
of law. Thus, but for the extent of the court's inquiry, the motion to
dismiss and the motion for summary judgment work quite similarly
20
in that they have their focus upon the law and not the facts. 1
That the "direct injury" and "target area" tests do not go to the
merits of the plaintiff's claim can also be seen by analyzing the
reasoning underlying the Malamud court's disavowal of its classification as a "direct injury" circuit. Since its decision in Volasco Products
Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. ,121 the Sixth Circuit has been placed
in that category,12 2 basically because in Volasco a supplier was not
permitted to recover for its loss of sales, despite the fact that its customer was awarded treble damages as a result of the defendant's antitrust violation.123 In addition, the Volasco court noted:
It is well established in the law that a supplier is too remote
and too far removed from the direct injury to recover damages resulting from violation of the anti-trust laws directed against the
24
supplier's customer. 1
The Malamud court was of the opinion that such language was not
reflective of the "direct injury" .test. Instead, the court vigorously asserted that since the supplier was removed from the case by way of a
directed verdict at the end of the plaintiff's proofs the Volasco court
was concerned with the directness of injury on the merits, and not
with the supplier's standing.125
That the Volasco court did not decide the case on the merits,
however, and that the court could have disposed of the supplier on
motion for summary judgment is apparent. The supplier was dismissed from the case because of his relationship to the anticompetitive conduct, i.e., his status as a supplier. Such relationship does not
have to be proven at trial in most cases; it would be obvious from the
allegations of the complaint. Moreover, if a trial would not have
added anything to the issue of the supplier's status, the case could
120 6 MOORE, supra note 114,
121 308

56.0213], at 27-33.

F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
122 See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1150 & n.15 (6th Cir. 1975).
123 308 F.2d at 394-95. It should be noted that, like the situation in valainud, the
plaintiffs in Volasco included persons who were officers and shareholders of the two
plaintiff corporations. Id. at 386.
124 Id. at 395.
125 521 F.2d at 1150-51.
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have been disposed of by way of a motion for summary judgment
initially rather than by way of a motion for a directed verdict at the
end of the plaintiff's case:
The essence of both motions is that there is no genuine issue of
material fact to be resolved by the trier of the facts, and that the
movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established facts. 126
Thus, where the plaintiff's status will be dispositive of his claim, a
decision on the merits is not required; rather, such a determination
may be made at a preliminary stage of the litigation. Other circuits
accomplish this result by applying the "direct injury" or "target area"
test where the question of the plaintiff's status is involved-such as
supplier, landlord, employee, or shareholder-on a motion for summary judgment or on a motion for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. In such cases, the plaintiff's claim, because it is
dependent upon his status, is disposed of on the ground that his injuries are not "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,"
i.e., that there is no causation in law.
Thus, the Malarnud court's fears that judicial scrutiny of antitrust
plaintiffs through standing tests cuts litigants off at too early a point in
the litigation are exaggerated. Although it may be proper to delay
dismissal of a plaintiff's claim until proofs have been entered in those
instances where it cannot be determined on the pleadings whether
the plaintiff's injury was direct or whether the plaintiff was in the
target area of the anticompetitive activity, there are many instances
where such determinations can be made on the pleadings. Even assuming, as Malaimud argues, that the issue is not whether the plaintiff
has standing, it would be proper in these cases to dismiss on the
pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
or to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

When all of the various "standing" tests are dissected and
analyzed, it becomes clear that the circuits have taken various routes
in an attempt to arrive at the same basic objective-a workable interpretation of section 4. In that pursuit, courts have been hampered
by the dearth of legislative history or clarification of purpose other
than the almost unmanageably broad wording of the statute itself.
Consequently, every circuit has been forced to adopt its own rule of
126

6

MOORE,

supra note 114,

56.04[2], at 73-75 (footnote omitted).
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statutory construction. Moreover, these rules have, through their
constant application on a case-by-case basis, become more firmly entrenched, resulting in polarization of opinion. Basic fairness suggests,
however, that section 4 be consistently interpreted so that private
plaintiffs may be treated uniformly throughout the circuits; therefore,
any solution to this problem must be forthcoming from decisionmakers who can speak with one voice.
One solution, which has been suggested by numerous commentators, would be for the United States Supreme Court to withdraw
from its position of non-intervention and begin to take cases for review. In this manner, the Court could adopt one of the circuit
tests1 27 for determining who is the proper party to bring a private
treble damage action, and then, on a case-by-case basis, apply that
test to the various types of plaintiffs who have been inconsistently
treated by the circuits. 128 While this solution would gradually result
127 Several commentators have suggested that if the Court were to adopt a "standing" test, the less restrictive "target area" approach would be appropriate. See, e.g.,
Alioto & Donnici, supra note 37, at 214-15; Beane, supra note 42, at 339; Pollock,
Standing To Sue, Remoteness of Injury, And The Passing-On Doctrine, 32 ANTITRUST
L.J. 5, 17-18 (1966).
The Court, while never dealing directly with the question of who would be a
proper litigant under section 4, has given special attention to the private antitrust litigant on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54
(1957); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750 (1947).
In several cases, the Court used sweeping language to recognize the congressional
mandate. For example, in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54
(1957), the Court noted:
Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined that such prohibited activities are
injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing private enforcement
of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect the victims of
the forbidden practices as well as the public ....
In the face of such a policy
this Court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond
what is specifically set forth by Congress in those laws.
(Footnotes & citations omitted.)
Similarly, in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236 (1948), the Court stated:
The statute [Sherman Act] does not confine its protection to consumers, or
to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. . . . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.
(Citations omitted.)
128 Compare Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (see notes 15-18 supra
and accompanying text), and Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956) (see notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text), with
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in uniform decisions in the circuits, the problem with this process is
that its starting point-statutory construction to arrive at the congressional intent-will necessarily be largely guesswork.
A second solution, and one that has received almost no attention
from commentators in the field, would be for Congress to amend section 4 of the Clayton Act in such a way as to guide the courts in their
determination of who can bring a private treble damage action. In
amending the act, Congress would have the benefit of the courts'
experience and could sift through the case law, choosing among the
multifarious fact situations which have been presented to the courts,
in order to determine those plaintiffs Congress deems should be
given access to the courts so that its national antitrust policy might be
fully enforced. Furthermore, the legislative branch is far better
equipped to resolve the controversy than is the judiciary. Congressional committees which would examine the question would have the
distinct advantage of being able to call upon not only the expertise of
the judiciary, but also the expertise of economists, business leaders
and members of the Department of Justice staff whose experience
and insight into the problem would prove invaluable. Finally, the
most salient benefit to congressional amendment of section 4 is that
this solution could be much more comprehensive than judicial action
which is necessarily confined to case-by-case determinations.
It is important to keep in mind that section 4 is a creature of the
legislature, and that it is an important legislative function to retain a
check upon the efficacy of a statute after its enactment. Since the
courts have found section 4 to be difficult to apply in the absence of
congressional guidance, it appears to be the duty of the legislature to
amend the statute so as to more clearly express the national policy
which the statute seeks to bring to fruition.
Glenn P. Callahan
Mulvev v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 443 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
923 (1971) (see notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text), and Congress Bldg. Corp. v.
Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) (see notes 30-36 supra and accompanying
text).

